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NOTES
TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY AND
UNDERSTANDING: RECOGNIZING THAT SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS SEX DISCRIMINATION
"We take these words [of Title VII] to mean that gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions." - U.S. Supreme Court (1989)r
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of protected categories.' Title
VIrs provision prohibiting sex discrimination was enacted to
eliminate gender inequality in the workplace by ensuring that
employment decisions are based on individual merit and not on
the gender of the employee.? Therefore, gender-based decisions
motivated either by the employee's sex4 (male or female) or by
1 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The relevant
portion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), reads:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
' The original purpose of Title VII was to promote employment decisions on
the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or sex. Price Wa-
terhouse, 490 U.S. at 243.
4 This Note, in accordance with Title VII interpretation, uses the terms gen-
der, sex and biological sex interchangeably. This Note also does not differentiate
between the phrases "gender discrimination," "discrimination based on sex," and
"discrimination because of sex." Convincing arguments have been advanced that
gender is not equivalent to sex and that the two terms should not be used synon-
ymously in the law. For a more complete discussion on this topic, see Mary Anne
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stereotypes associated with the individual's sex (masculine or
feminine) violate Title VII's mandate of workplace equality.5
Similarly, harassment of an individual because of the
individual's sex or because of the individual's failure to con-
form to preconceived gender roles violates Title VII because
such harassment perpetuates gender inequality. The threshold
question in determining Title VII violations is whether the ha-
rassment is gender-based. Therefore, it should make no differ-
ence whether the harasser and the victim are the same gender,
provided that the harassment occurs because of the employee's
gender.6
While this inquiry appears rather straightforward, several
district and circuit courts continue to disagree on the issue of
whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII.v Simply defined, same-sex sexual harassment refers to
gender-motivated harassment committed by an individual
toward a member of the same sex. There are two types of con-
duct which may constitute same-sex sexual harassment: (1)
erotic harassment-harassment which typically entails sexual
advances, invitations or innuendoes toward the victim based
on the victim's gender; and (2) non-erotic harassment-harass-
ment based on the victim's gender but not motivated by sexual
desire. Non-erotic harassment generally includes derogatory
statements, ridicule and physical or verbal assaults.8 The com-
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1995) ("gender
[is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female"); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," 'Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va.
1996).
" The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address this issue directly. A petition for
writ of certiorari on a same-sex sexual harassment case in the Fifth Circuit,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), was filed
on October 10, 1996. On December 16, 1996, the Supreme Court requested that
the Justice Department submit briefs on the issues raised in that case. The Su-
preme Court has yet to decide whether to grant or deny cert. U.S. Supreme Court
Seeks Advice from Justice Department on Same-Sex Harassment Appeal, West's
Legal News, Dec. 18, 1996, available at 1996 WL 722516 [hereinafter Supreme
Court Seeks Advice].
8 For consistency and convenience, the author of this Note coined the terms
erotic and non-erotic harassment to refer to two different types of harassment that
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mon denominator in both erotic and non-erotic harassment
that makes each type of conduct actionable is the fact that the
harassment occurs because of the employee's gender.' Circuits
are divided on whether Title VII allows for same-sex sexual
harassment claims, and also on the issue of which type of
same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable.
Several district courts, the Fourth, Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") have held that same-sex sexual harassment may
violate Title VII.O However, the majority of circuit and dis-
comprise sexual harassment and, by extension, same-sex sexual harassment. Erotic
and non-erotic harassment are easily understood in the context of opposite-sex
sexual harassment. For example, Title VII opposite-sex sexual harassment claims
typically arise in two different circumstances, both equally actionable. The first
type is where a male subjects a female to unwanted sexual touchings, invitations
and innuendoes because of her sex. This Note refers to such conduct as erotic
sexual harassment. The second type involves a male subjecting a female, because
of her gender, to hostile, rude or disparaging treatment that differs in kind and
degree from treatment that males receive. This Note refers to the latter conduct
as non-erotic sexual harassment. See Tielgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1500; see also Har-
ris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993) (plaintiff prevailed on hostile
environment claim where defendant called her a "dumb ass woman," said 'you're a
woman, what do you know," and suggested the female employee have sex to nego-
tiate her raise); Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile
Work Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1363 (arguing that "all forms of gender
discrimination that affect an employee's work environment are potentially action-
able under Title VII without regard to whether they arise from sexual motives").
Other scholars have employed various terms to articulate these two distinct types
of gender-motivated harassment. For example, Thorpe utilizes the term 'gender-
based harassment" to describe the conduct referred to in this Note as non-erotic
harassment Id. at 1363. This latter type of harassment based on discriminatory
insult and ridicule was originally recognized in the context of racial harassment.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); cee also CATHERINE
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 237 (1979). Racial harass-
ment violations of Title VII are often predicated on a supervisor's racial epithets,
derogatory statements and other types of verbal and physical harassment directed
at the employee because of the employee's race. Similarly, sexual harassment that
is not erotically motivated is often predicated on a supervisor's gender epithets,
derogatory statements and other types of verbal and physical harassment directed
towards the employee because of the employee's sex.
Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501.
10 Three federal appellate courts and sixteen federal district courts have held
that same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII. Supreme Court
Seeks Advice, supra note 7; see, eg., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99
F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding same-sex sexual harassment claim actionable
where supervisor is homosexual); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.
1996) (denying summary judgment in same-sex sexual harassment claim); Joyner
v. AAA Cooper Transp., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court
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trict courts that have addressed this issue have only been
willing to recognize the first type of same-sex sexual harass-
ment, erotic harassment, where the supervisor makes sexual
advances toward the subordinate. Similarly, the EEOC Guide-
lines explicitly state that; erotic harassment violates Title VII
but are silent as to whether non-erotic harassment should also
be actionable. Most courts have failed to recognize the second
type of same-sex sexual harassment, non-erotic harassment, in
which the supervisor, typically motivated by the employee's
failure to conform to stereotypical gender ideals, subjects the
employee to hostile, rude or disparaging treatment. To date,
the Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to recognize that non-
erotic same-sex sexual harassment claims may be actionable
under Title VII."
Several district courts and the Fifth Circuit have refused
to recognize any form of same-sex sexual harassment.12 The
circuit split in recognizing erotic same-sex sexual harassment
claims, and the failure by the majority of courts to recognize
non-erotic same-sex sexual harassment claims undermine Title
ViI's goal of workplace equality.
Both erotic and non-erotic same-sex sexual harassment
should be considered sex discrimination under Title VII. First,
gender is the motivating force behind both erotic and non-erot-
ic sexual harassment. Second, employment decisions based on
an employee's gender perpetuate gender inequality. Third,
imposing traditional stereotypical gender-role behaviors sys-
tematically disadvantages women. These three premises under-
lie Title VII's prohibition of opposite-sex sexual harassment
and are equally applicable to the context of same-sex sexual
decision holding that same-sex sexual harassment claim is actionable); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Prescott v. Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls
World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). These are just a few representative cases.
n Quick, 90 F.3d 1372 (1996).
12 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3310
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-568); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-
52 (5th Cir. 1994); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash.
1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995); Myers v. El Paso,
874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995). These are just a few representative cases
that hold that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII.
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harassment. Same-sex sexual harassment is motivated by the
employee's gender. Regardless of whether the harasser and the
victim are the same sex, where gender is a motivating factor
behind the harassment, gender inequality is perpetuated.
Moreover, an employer's harassment of an employee because
he or she fails to conform to stereotypical gender-role behaviors
reinforces what the harasser feels are the appropriate roles for
men and women; such roles typically undervalue women and
elevate men.'3 This Note concludes that employers 4 should
be prohibited from making gender-motivated employment deci-
sions, including the decision to harass an employee of the
same sex. Only employment decisions that are gender neutral
will result in equality of the sexes and will advance the goals
of Title VII.
Part I of this Note closely examines the language of Title
VII and briefly discusses the rationale for recognizing opposite-
sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII. Part II discuss-
es and critiques the current legal treatment of both types of
same-sex sexual harassment claims: erotic and non-erotic ha-
rassment. This Part also discusses various representative deci-
sions by both those courts that hold that Title VII prohibits
same-sex sexual harassment and the opinions of the courts
that reach the opposite conclusion. Part III analyzes how both
types of same-sex sexual harassment are sex discrimination
and violate Title VII. This Part also discusses the problems
inherent in the standard that courts currently utilize when
determining whether the employer discriminated because of
gender, the "but for your sex" standard. This Part then propos-
es a modified approach, a "because of your sex" standard, for
' See infra notes 199, 201-202 and accompanying text.
" Title VII liability is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982). Therefore, an employer is
liable for harassment inflicted by coworkers and supervisors where the employer
knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take corrective action. Id.
For ease of reference, this Note will often use the term 'employer" to refer to the
individual inflicting the harassment.
5 The most obvious employment decisions are decisions directly regarding hir-
ing, firing and promotions. However, Title VII is not limited to these employment
decisions. The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted Title VII to include the
privilege of working in an environment free of discriminatory insult and ridicule.
Thus, since 1986 it has been settled law that sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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the analysis of same-sex sexual harassment cases. This new
standard avoids the anomalous and absurd result, which is
currently possible, in which same-sex and opposite-sex sexual
harassment claims are recognized but bisexual harassers are
granted immunity. Finally, Part IV discusses various public
policy reasons for holding same-sex sexual harassment action-
able under Title VII and the consequences of the failure to
recognize these claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Title VII was created in order to eliminate unfair and un-
equal treatment on the basis of protected categories, including
sex. To achieve these remedial goals, Title VII must be inter-
preted broadly. 6 The critical inquiry involved in sexual ha-
rassment cases seeks to determine whether the employer's
actions were gender-motivated. When gender is used as a moti-
vating factor in an employment decision and there is no legit-
imate reason for the decision, the purpose of Title VII is clearly
undermined, and equal treatment for women in the workplace
is jeopardized.
A. Interpreting the Language of Title VII: Comparing Title
VII's Prohibition of Race Discrimination to Sex
Discrimination
The language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
subject to varying interpretation. The drafters of Title VII ne-
glected to define the words "discrimination," "terms" and "con-
ditions" of employment, and the phrase "because of... sex. "17
Because the legislative history regarding the inclusion of sex
as a protected category is scarce," courts and commentators
16 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989), The broad remedial
purpose of Title VII requires courts to interpret the statute liberally in order to
effectuate Congress' intent to eliminate employment discrimination and its conse-
quential effects.
17 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); see supra
note 2; see also RALPH J. LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB, THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMI-
NATION 112 (1988).
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eliminate racial
discrimination in the hiring and promoting practices of employers. The noble idea
of securing racial equality in the workplace was not paralleled by, nor accompa-
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have drawn analogies between Congress' inclusion of race and
its inclusion of sex as protected categories in Title VII.1 9 In-
deed, the statute on its face treats "race" and "sex" exactly the
same; they are coequal and should be analyzed as such."
Therefore, while several of the legislature's statements regard-
ing Title VII focused specifically on race, these statements
should be understood to apply to sex as well.2 Additionally, it
is helpful to analyze cases that involve discrimination based on
other statutorily protected categories, such as race, to discern
how Title VII should be construed in same-sex sexual ha-
rassment cases.'
nied with, a congressional desire to achieve gender equality in the workplace. "The
story of how gender came to be included in Title VII as a prohibited basis of em-
ployment discrimination is anything but edifying." Indeed, the original bill did not
even include "sex" as a protected category, the term "sex" was only proposed as an
amendment to the bill on the last day of the floor debate in an attempt to block
passage of the entire Act. The attempt failed, and the Act, which included discrim-
ination based upon sex, was passed. The amendment to the original bill adding
"sex" to "race, color religion and national origin" was proposed by Representative
Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the House Rules Committee. Representa-
tive Smith's ploy failed. As a result, "one of the most powerful remedies for sex
discrimination available today owes its origin to a misfired political tactic on the
part of opponents of the Act." LINDGREN & TAUB, supra note 17, at 110-11. Be-
cause of the hasty and unexpected inclusion of sex as a protected group under
Title VII, it is difficult to discern Congress' intent.
"' See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 n.9; Mentor, 477 U.S. at 65.
21 MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 129; see, eg., Price Waterhouse, 490 US. at
244 n.9. While the congressional statements may have focused on race, these
statements are not limited to the context of race. Instead, the statements are
understood to be "general statements on the meaning of Title VII." Id. at 243, 244
n.9.
21 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 n.9.
I The first hostile work environment cause of action was a claim of racial
discrimination in the workplace. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). This theory was then applied to oppo3ite-sex
sexual harassment claims. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Similarly, it should be
applied to same-sex sexual harassment claims.
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Discrimination based upon race-any race-is prohibited
under Title VII.2 The reason for affording employees
protections from race-based decisions is that prior reliance on
race as a criteria for decisionmaking has historically privileged
whites and disadvantaged blacks. Race-based decisions harm
both the individual who is treated unfairly and the minority
race as a whole.'
Title VII was originally intended to protect African-Ameri-
can employees from discriminatory employment practices.25
However, Congress' use of the unmodified term "race," instead
of the specific term "African-American race," enables Title VII
to prohibit discrimination against any race, regardless of the
race of the employer or employee.2" Therefore, while Title
VIrs prohibition against racial discrimination was originally
intended to protect only African-Americans-a historically
disadvantaged group-the statute has been recognized to pro-
tect all races, including whites-a historically empowered
group.27 Indeed, the unmodified term "race" allows a "majori-
ty" race to bring suit against a "minority" race for alleged dis-
criminatory practices.'
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that
Title VII is not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohib-
its discriminatory preference for any racial group); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. and
Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding that nonblack employees
were permitted to bring a cause of action under Title VII on the basis that they
were discriminated against because of their race by a black supervisor); Calcote v.
Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (holding that
racial harassment of white employees by black supervisor violates Title VII). In
addition, the EEOC interprets Title VII to proscribe racial discrimination in pri-
vate employment against whites and nonwhites. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279.
2 Consequently, the legislative history of Title VII demonstrates that "Congress
was concerned with eliminating not only specific instances of employment discrimi-
nation, but its broader economic and social effects as well." MARK A. ROTHSTEIN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, EtmLOY:ENT LAW 225 (3d ed. 1987); see id. at 60 (excerpt from
Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense Of The Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1976)); infra note 230 and accompanying text.
' Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; see ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 24, at 225-
27 (briefly reviewing the legislative history of Title VII).
28 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 278-90; see supra note 23.
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 278-90.
Id. at 273, 279 (holding that a white plaintiff can sue for reverse discrimi-
nation under Title VII). "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination in private em-
ployment against white persons upon the same standards as racial discrimination
against nonwhites." Id.
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Both the Supreme Court and the EEOC Guidelines have
interpreted Title VII to prohibit racial discrimination against
both white and nonwhite employees.' The Supreme Court
and the EEOC have stressed that any other interpretation
would subvert the mandate of Title VII, which is the elimina-
tion of all employment practices that disadvantage a statuto-
rily protected group." Additionally, the inclusion of the term
"race" allows an employee to bring suit against his or her em-
ployer of the same race as long as the victim was discriminated
against because of his or her race." Just as Title VIIs prohi-
bition of race discrimination allows for same-race racial ha-
rassment claims, its prohibition of sex discrimination should
allow for same-sex sexual harassment claims.
Similar to the protected category of race, the inclusion of
sex as a protected category was initially interpreted to protect
a historically disadvantaged sex from a historically empowered
sex. Congress may have originally interpreted Title VII to
apply only to the discriminatory treatment of women employ-
ees by male employers. However, it is well recognized that
Title VII also protects men from discriminatory treatment by
women." The proper analysis does not seek merely to pro-
2 Id. at 279.
" The Supreme Court stated 'to proceed otherwise would constitute a deroga-
tion of the EEOC's Congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which operate
to disadvantage the employment opportunities of any group protected by Title VII
including Caucasians ... " Id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 74-31, 7 FEP 1326,
1328 (CCH) (1973)).
11 Title VII prohibits same-race racial harassment. See, eg., Hansborough v.
City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ind. 1992)
(recognizing intraracial discrimination claims in discriminatory termination case);
Franceshi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712, 723 (D.P.R. 1992) ("intra-racial color
discrimination claims are authorized by both Title VII and existing Supreme Court
precedent); Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403 (NJ). Ga. 1989),
affd, 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1992) (recognizing same-
race racial harassment claim by a light-skinned black plaintiff against a dark-
skinned black supervisor). These courts recognized same-race racial harassment
claims because the employer's discriminatory conduct was based on the race of the
employee. Similarly, same-sex harassment should be equally recognized as long as
the discriminatory conduct is based on sex.
' Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1994) (ac-
knowledging reverse sex discrimination claim but stating that the male employer
failed to satisfy the requirements for such a claim); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding reverse discrimination challenge to a city fire
department's affirmative action plan for women fire fighters), reh,g en banc denied,
No. 92-3340, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25526 (6th Cir. Oct. 4, 1993), cert. denied, 510
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tect a historically disadvantaged group from a historically
dominant group." Rather, Title VII protects against all gen-
der-based decisions in the workplace.'
The Supreme Court stated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
that Congress' intent to forbid employers from taking gender
into account in making employment decisions appears on the
face of the statute." Because there is scant legislative history
regarding Congress' intent behind prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion, this statutory language is crucial. Title VII expressly
mandates that no employer may discriminate on the basis of
sex.36 The term "sex," like "race," is unmodified in the statute.
Therefore, by its plain meaning, Title VII protects employees of
either sex from being discriminated against because of their
sex, regardless of whether the sex of the employer and the
employee are the same." As long as the harassment is moti-
vated because of the victim's gender, Title VII is violated.38
The plain language of Title VII demonstrates that a
plaintiffs cause of action should not be limited to opposite-sex
harassment." Had Congress intended to prohibit only dis-
crimination by harassers of the opposite sex, it would have
stated that no person shall discriminate against a "member of
the opposite sex."4 With such phrasing, Congress would have
U.S. 1164 (1994); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(stating that standard for discrimination should be modified to accommodate differ-
ent employment discrimination contexts, e.g., reverse discrimination).
' Historically, women in western culture have been considered the inferior and
subordinate sex. Women have traditionally been defined in their relation to men,
who have historically been considered the superior or dominant sex. Man's ability
to retain his historically elite position in society is dependent upon his ability to
subordinate women. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 157.
', Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
2' Id. at 239.
" See supra note 2.
" Title VII, on its face, protects all employees from sex discrimination without
reference to the sex of the employer or employee. Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae of
the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU at 3, Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
" Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va.
1996).
" See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996);
Prescott v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
41 Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550 ("[Hlad Congress intended to prevent only
heterosexual sexual harassment, it could have used the term !member of the oppo-
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prohibited both male-female sexual harassment and female-
male harassment." Congress' failure to include such language
and to amend the statute to reflect such a position demon-
strates its willingness to have Title VII interpreted more
broadly.' By omitting specification as to gender, Congress
allows a claim to be brought by either sex, regardless of wheth-
er the employer and employee are the same sex.
The EEOC Guidelines,43 which are given substantial def-
erence by the courts," are also helpful tools in interpreting
the relationship between Title VII and sexual harassment. The
EEOC Guidelines unequivocally state that same-sex sexual
harassment violates Title VII, stressing that "[t]he victim does
not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser."
site sex.').
41 Id
42 See id,
' In 1980, the EEOC published its Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). Specifically, the guidelines state:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of See. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
Id. § 1604.11(a). Courts have interpreted these guidelines to prohibit two types of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment harass-
ment. See Aeritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61 (1986).
" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US. 125,
141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating
that the EEOC Guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance'))).
"EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b) (1981) (citation omitted). The relevant
portion of the EEOC Guidelines reads:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser.
Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the crucial in-
quiry is whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex
differently from members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser
may be of the same sex where, for instance, the sexual harassment is
based on the victim's sex (not the victim's sexual preference) and the ha-
rasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way.
Id. § 615.2(b)(3).
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Federal courts have been faced with interpreting the broad
language of Title VII to determine whether same-sex sexual
harassment cases fall within the Act's purview. The analytical
approaches used, and the conclusions reached, by a number of
courts are contradictory. This lack of uniformity in approaches
and results sends a mixed message to victims of same-sex
sexual harassment regarding their legal rights and remedies.
By examining the similar motives behind opposite-sex harass-
ment and same-sex harassment, it will become evident that
both erotic and non-erotic same-sex sexual harassment should
be actionable.
B. Recognition of Opposite-Sex Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination under Title VII
It is well settled that opposite-sex sexual harassment46
violates Title VII because it is a form of sex discrimination.47
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson" expanded the scope of Title VII when it recognized
that this statute protects employees from "discriminatory sexu-
al harassment."49 The Court held that when a supervisor
"sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex."0 The
Supreme Court recognized that the consequences of using
biological sex as a motivating factor for harassment are similar
to the effects of using gender as a factor in any decision: when
" There are several situations which constitute opposite-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII. Opposite-sex sexual harassment occurs whenever an employer
discriminates against an employee of the opposite sex on the basis of the
employee's gender. The inquiry must always come back to the question of whether
the victim's gender motivated the harassment. If the answer is yes, a violation of
Title VII has occurred. If the answer is no, regardless of how awful the mistreat-
ment, the harassing behavior is not sex discrimination and is not actionable under
Title VII. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989). For in-
stance, Title VII is not violated when a male employer harasses a female employ-
ee because she speaks with a southern accent if the sole criterion on which he is
basing his harassment is her accent--regardless of how severe or pervasive the
harassment is. Id.
"' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
48 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
" Id. at 57.
'0 Id. at 64.
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gender-based decisions are made, women and men are classi-
fied according to their sex and not according to their individual
merit.5' Moreover, when the sexes are viewed as distinct cate-
gories in contrast and opposition to one another, women have
historically been perceived as inferior to men. 2 After Meritor,
sexual harassment--either quid pro quos or hostile work en-
vironment--is viewed as a form of sex discrimination be-
cause the harassment is (1) motivated by the employee's gen-
der, and (2) hinders equality of the sexes.4
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Quid pro quo harassment56 occurs when an employer of-
fers tangible, economic job benefits in exchange for sexual
favors from an employee, or where an employer purposely
withholds favorable treatment when requests for sex are de-
nied."7 In order to prevail on a quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment claim, the employee plaintiff must prove the following-
(1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harass-
ment was based on the employee's sex; (4) the employee's
"' According to Catherine hMacinnon, sex discrimination is the result of trans-
forming biological sex differences into systematic social inequalities. Relying on sex
as a criterion benefits men and is detrimental to women. MACKINNON, supra note
8, at 126-27.
" Sex discrimination is a "system that defines women as inferior to men, that
cumulatively disadvantages women for their differences from men, as well as ig-
nores their similarities." MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 116.
' Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor requires or re-
quests sexual favors in return for tangible job benefits, including not being termi-
nated. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating
that the gravamen of a quid pro juo claim is that an actual job benefit is condi-
tioned on the employee's submission to "sexual blackmail" and adverse consequenc-
es follow the employee's refusal to cooperate).
" Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor's
conduct creates a work atmosphere that is so abusive that it alters the terms and
conditions of employment. The conduct must be severe or pervasive. Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
"' See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (sexual ha-
rassment in the workplace is a barrier to sexual equality).
56 Quid pro quo harassment is described in §§ 1604.11(a)Cl) and (a)(2) of the
EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment. See supra note 43.
See Carrero, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Rabidue v. Osceola Ret Co., 805
F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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acceptance or rejection of the harassment affected tangible as-
pects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment; and (5) respondeat superior.58
One of the earliest cases recognizing quid pro quo sexual
harassment was Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co." In Tomkins, the Third Circuit held that a supervisor vio-
lates Title VII when he or she "makes sexual advances or de-
mands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that
employee's job status--evaluation, continued employment, pro-
motion, or other aspects of career development-on a favorable
response to those advances. . . .' More recent case law has
held that an employee need not show actual economic loss in
order to prove quid pro quo harassment."1
2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Discrimination based on the theory of a hostile work envi-
ronment was first recognized as actionable under Title VII in
the early 1980s."2 The Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of
Dundee,63 adopting the EEOC Guidelines," held that sexual
harassment may be actionable under Title VII regardless of
whether there was tangible job detriment.' The Henson
court, in prohibiting noneconomic sexual harassment, stated
that sexual harassment is "every bit the arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace as racial harassment is to ra-
cial equality."" An employee must prove the following in or-
der to prevail on a hostile work environment claim: (1) he or
she belongs to a protected group; (2) the harassment was un-
welcome; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the ha-
" Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1982).
19 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
'o LINDGREN & TAUB, supra note 17, at 171 (citing Tomkins, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977)).
61 Karibian v. Columbia Univ.," 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2693 (1994) (holding that plaintiff need only show a threat of economic loss if she
did not comply with the employer's sexual demands).
62 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
6 Section 1604.11(a)(3) of the EEOC Guidelines describes hostile or abusive
work environment harassment. See supra note 43.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
66 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson,
682 F.2d at 902).
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rassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the
employee's work performance and creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) that the em-
ployer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to implement appropriate corrective actionY
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor held that Title
VII is violated when an employee proves that sex-based dis-
crimination created an abusive or hostile environment.' The
Court stated that inclusion within Title VII of the phrase
"'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a con-
gressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment,"" thus indicat-
ing the need for a broad inclusive application of Title VII. In
recognizing that sexual harassment violated Title VII, the
Meritor Court relied on the EEOC Guidelines which provide
that prohibited sexual harassment includes harassment that
has "the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment."71 The EEOC
Guidelines were developed based on a synthesis of prior case
law which protected the rights of all employees "to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult."72 Specifically, the Guidelines drew upon previous-
ly recognized national origin and racial harassment claims. 3
' Henson, 682 F.2d at 909. Element (5) is also referred to as respondeat supe-
rior liability. See generally Justin S. Weddle, Title VII Sexual Harassment Recog-
nizing an Employer's Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95
COLUmL L. REv. 724 (1995) (analyzing and critiquing various theories of employer
liability in Title VII sexual harassment cases).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id The Meritor Court stated that 'a plaintiff may establish a violation of
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment." Id. at 66. The theory of hostile work environment
harassment was further articulated in Harris u. Forklift Systems, Inc., where the
Court held that an employee need not prove psychological injury for the claim to
survive under Title VII. 114 S. CL 367 (1993).
70 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added) (quoting Lo3 Angeles Depot of Wa-
ter and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
" Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
72 Id.
" I& Meritor was the first Supreme Court case to recognize that a sexual
harassment claim creating a hostile work environment was actionable under Title
VII. Hostile work environment claims had previously been recognized by the court
of appeals with regard to claims of racial harassment. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
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Indeed, in Rogers v. EEOC74 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that an employer violated Title VII by cre-
ating an offensive work environment for Hispanic employ-
ees.75 Thereafter, this hostile work environment theory was
applied to other racial harassment claims.76 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in Henson, extended this principle to the context of sexual
harassment. The Meritor Court simply adopted this rationale
in its holding, stressing that "nothing in Title VII suggests
that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual
harassment should not likewise be prohibited."77 While the
Supreme Court was willing to follow the lead of the EEOC and
prior circuit court decisions in recognizing hostile work envi-
ronment opposite-sex sexual harassment claims, the Court has
thus far been reluctant to follow a similar lead by the EEOC
and some circuit court decisions in recognizing that same-sex
sexual harassment violates Title VII.
II. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMs
Circuits are divided with regard to whether same-sex sex-
ual harassment claims may be brought under Title VII. The
origin of this split can be traced back to two divergent cases
from the Northern District of Illinois: Wright v. Methodist
Youth Services, Inc.,7" a 1981 case where the court held that
Title VII clearly encompasses erotic same-sex sexual harass-
ment; and Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,79  a 1988 case which
held that Title VII should not protect against any form of
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit
stated that "the phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in Section
703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice
of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimi-
nation. . . . One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological sta-
bility of minority group workers . . . ." Id. at 238.
74 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
75 Id.
1 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. St.
Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Banta v. United
States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977)).
77 Id.
18 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
7' 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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same-sex sexual harassment." Both cases failed to recognize
that non-erotic same-sex sexual harassment may violate Title
VII.
A. Courts that Have Held that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Is Not Actionable under Title VII
The Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North Ameri-
ca,81 was the first federal appellate court to address directly
the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment was action-
able under Title VII 2 The Fifth Circuit held that male-on-
male harassment was not actionable even though the harass-
ment had sexual overtones.s" Garcia involved a male supervi-
sor who on several occasions harassed a male employee by
grabbing the employee's crotch and simulating sex with the
employee from behind.' The court did not analyze whether
the harassment was gender motivated, nor did it discuss
whether the harassment created an atmosphere of gender
inequality. Rather, the Fifth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs hos-
tile work environment claim in a mere two sentences.! The
Garcia court simply reiterated the holding from one of its own
previous unpublished opinions, Giddens v. Shell Oil, where it
" See Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 732 (N.D. IlM. 1996).
Dating back farther, the Third Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, in
dicta, recognized the potential for a same-sex sexual harassment cause of action in
1977. See Tomkin v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tietgen v.
Brown's Westminster Motors, 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
81 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming the dismissal of an employee's same-
sex sexual harassment Title VII claim).
Schiber, 941 F. Supp. at 732.
Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451.
Id. at 448. Prior to Garcia's complaint, two other arguably similar com-
plaints had been lodged against this supervisor. Id.
The entire sexual harassment discussion in the Garcia opinion consists of
the following two sentences:
Finally, we held in Giddens v. Shell Oil Co. that "[harassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII
even though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender
discrimination.m" Thus what[a male supervisor) did to [a male employee] could
not in any event constitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title
VII, and hence summary judgment in favor of all defendants was proper on
this basis also.
Id. at 451-52 (internal citations omitted).
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held that "harassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII." The
Garcia court discussed neither the facts of Giddens, nor the
applicability of that holding to the instant facts. The Fifth Cir-
cuit also failed to explain why this conduct did not constitute
gender discrimination, even though the conduct was directed
only toward men and not toward women.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit cited as
persuasive authority the Illinois district court case of Goluszek
v. Smith,8 which involved an entirely different set of facts.
Garcia involved erotic harassment. In contrast, Goluszek in-
volved non-erotic harassment. In that case Goluszek, a male
employee, claimed that his employer discriminated against him
by refusing to remedy the continuous sexual harassment di-
rected toward him by his male coworkers.' The harassment
of which Goluszek complained consisted of his male coworkers
commenting on Goluszek's unmarried status, and taunting him
because of his sexual naivet6 and his "abnormally" sensitive
disposition to comments pertaining to sex. 9 Additionally, the
coworkers harassed Goluszek for not desiring to engage in
sexually explicit conduct with one of the female employees,
they showed him pornographic pictures of nude women, and
they accused him of being gay or bisexual." The coworkers
subjected Goluszek to such harassment because he did not con-
form to what they considered "appropriate" male conduct.
Goluszek reported the harassment to his supervisors to no
avail.9
Goluszek brought suit under Title VII claiming hostile
work environment harassment. Goluszek claimed that he was
subjected to such harassment because of his gender; if he had
" Id. at 451 (citing Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6,
1993) (unpublished)).
', Id. (citing Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
s' Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1454.
8' Id. at 1452.
Id. at 1453-54. Specific harassment included statements that Goluszek need-
ed to "get married and get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the
legs of a woman," and that Goluszek should date Carla, a female coworker, "be-
cause she fucks." Additionally, male coworkers continuously taunted Goluezek by
asking whether he had "gotten any pussy," by showing him pictures of nude wom-
en and by accusing him of being gay or bisexual. Id.
91 Id.
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been a woman, he would not have received the same treat-
ment. Moreover, Goluszekes complaint asserted that had he
been female, his supervisors would have taken actions to reme-
dy the harassment, but because he was male, his supervisors
did nothing.92 It appears that the Goluszek court was so deter-
mined to rule that same-sex sexual harassment did not violate
Title VII that the court based its decision on an argument that
was not even advanced by the defendants.' The defendants
argued unsuccessfully that Goluszek could not prove the ha-
rassment was because of his sex.' The court, sua sponte,
stated that the more convincing argument is that plaintiffs
claim is not actionable because the "defendant's conduct was
not the type of conduct Congress intended to sanction when it
enacted Title VII."95 The court paid lip service to the broad
goal of Title VI--equal employment opportunity-but simulta-
neously espoused an extremely narrow Application of Title VII,
as applying only to cases of sexual demands on less powerful
employees.9 6
Without citing any precedent or interpretive case law, the
Goluszek court concluded that in enacting the statute, Con-
gress intended to eliminate the imbalance and abuse of power
which results in discrimination against vulnerable groups. 9
The court imposed a requirement that Goluszek needed to
prove not only that he was harassed because of his sex, but
also that his work environment "treated males as inferior." s
In requiring Goluszek to prove the existence of an anti-male
2 Id. at 1454.
' The court stated that it reached its conclusion by relying on an argument
that the "[employer] failed to make." Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
94 Id.
S Id.
9 Id
' Id. The court supported its interpretation of Title VII by relying solely on a
student law review note published in 1984. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims
of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52
(1984). Consequently, numerous courts have criticized the Goluszeh decision. See,
e.g., Miller v. Vesta, Inc., No. 94-C-1270, 1996 WL 683725 (ED. WIs. 1996) ("the
Goluszek court built its understanding of Congressional intent upon a foundation of
quicksand"); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev.
1996) ("Notwithstanding the Goluszek court's sweeping statements regarding Con-
gressional intent, its analysis is unsupported by any legislative history.").
" Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 354.
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environment, the court imposed additional burdens on the
plaintiff not found in legislative history, statutory language or
Supreme Court precedent."
The Goluszek court based its holding on a misinterpreta-
tion of Title VII and a misunderstanding of congressional in-
tent. The court superficially reasoned that because Goluszek
was a male working in a male dominated workplace, the con-
duct complained of could not constitute gender dis-
crimination.' 0 The court disregarded the importance of the
fact that Goluszek was treated differently because of his sex.
The court admitted that the record supported a finding that "a
fact-finder could reasonably conclude that if Goluszek were a
woman, the [employer] would have taken action to stop the
harassment" and that the "harassment was pervasive and con-
tinuous."' Despite this recognition that Goluszek was treat-
ed differently because of his sex,'0 2 the court held that such
conduct was not actionable. While the court recognized that a
direct application of the established legal standard in opposite-
sex sexual harassment cases "created by the courts would sal-
vage Goluszek's claim," it chose instead to adopt its own read-
ing of Title VII. °  However, the conduct at issue--differential
treatment based on a protected category-is exactly the type of
conduct Congress sought to eliminate when it enacted Title VII. °4
" Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Wil-
liams court offered the following six reasons for disregarding the rationale in
Goluszek: (1) the court relied solely on a student law review note for its central
proposition; (2) the student note was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Meritor, which articulates plaintiff's burdens in sexual harassment cases; (3) the
statutory language of Title VII is not limited to harassment by the opposite sex;
(4) Goluszek departs from Supreme Court precedent established in Meritor; (5)
Goluszek departs from the EEOC Guidelines; and (6) the injury suffered because of
same-sex harassment is as severe as that suffered because of opposite-sex harass-
ment. Id. at 8.
'oo Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
101 Id. at 1455.
102 The court stated that "in fact, Goluszek may have been harassed 'because'
he is male, but that harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male
environment in the workplace." Id. at 1456.
103 Id.
104 The coworkers' conduct also created a work environment that was hostile,
humiliating and denigrating toward women. The coworkers' conduct, by referring to
women as sexual objects and by showing Goluszek pornographic pictures of naked
women, perpetuated harmful and stereotypical attitudes about women and women's
roles. Such conduct constitutes a bar to gender equality in the workplace as it
[Vol. 62: 11651184
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The Garcia court's blind reliance on Goluszek and Giddens
demonstrates that the court appears to have adopted the hold-
ing it desired to reach, despite the lack of support for its posi-
tion. °5 Unfortunately, subsequent district and circuit court
cases continue to rely on these decisions in support of their
determination that same-sex sexual harassment is not action-
able."5 Recently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 7 the Fifth Circuit reluctantly held that the plaintiff's
same-sex sexual harassment claim was not cognizable under
Title VII even though the defendant's egregious conduct con-
sisted of threatening to rape an employee of the same sex.'
conceptualizes women as sex objects and not as coworkers.
Moreover, the coworkers' harassment of Goluszek for not conforming to the
heterosexual male gender stereotype of sexual prowess and sexual dominance over
women reinforces traditional gender stereotypes, which are harmful to women be-
cause they connote images of women as socially and sexually passive. The underly-
ing controlling message of the coworkers' language and harassing conduct was in
every way a barrier to gender equality in the workplace. Such conduct violates
Title VII on two levels: (1) Goluszek was treated differently because he was a
male; and (2) the conduct itself and the employer's failure to remedy such inappro-
priate behavior perpetuated an environment hostile to women. See infra text ac-
companying notes 214-218.
" See, e.g., Schoiber v. Emro Mftg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
('The Fifth Circuit's stance on the issue [of same-sex harassment] is well-recorded,
but minimally supported.").
1" For a few representative district court cases, see Ashworth v. Roundup Co.,
899 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ('accept[ing] the reasoning of the district
court in Goluszek, and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia"); Beneli-itis v.
Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995) ("acceptling| the reasoning of the district
court in Goluszek and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 67 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769 (E.D. La.
Mar. 24, 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendant based on Garcia hold-
ing), affd, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.), reh denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), petition
for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-568); Myers v. City of
El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Hopkins v. Baltimore, 871 F. Supp.
822 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
107 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). A petition for writ of certiorari was filed on
October 10, 1996. On December 16, 1996, the Supreme Court requested that the
Justice Department submit briefs on the issues raised in that case. The Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether to grant or deny cert. See Supreme Court Seeks
Advice, supra note 7.
log 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.), rehg denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-568). Defendant's conduct
included the use of force to push a bar of soap into plaintiffs anus and threats of
homosexual rape.
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The court stated that it was bound by its earlier decision in
Garcia to hold that Title VII does not proscribe such con-
duct.10 9
B. Courts that Have Held that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
of an Erotic Nature Is Actionable under Title VII
The overwhelming majority of federal district and circuit
courts that have addressed the issue of same-sex sexual ha-
rassment consisting of sexual advances have held that such
conduct violates Title V. n One of the first cases to address
erotically-driven same-sex sexual harassment was the 1981
Illinois district court case of Wright v. Methodist Youth Servic-
es."' In Wright, a male supervisor subjected Wright, a male
employee, to overt homosexual advances."' Wright alleged
that his employment was terminated in violation of Title VII
because he resisted these advances.' The defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Wright court held that it was a
violation of Title VII to terminate a male employee because he
refused homosexual advances made toward him by his supervi-
I" Id. at 119. The court stated that Garcia was binding precedent and that it
could not overrule a prior panel's decision. Id. at 118. See Supreme Court Seeks
Advice, supra note 7.
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating
there exists considerable weight of authority in which federal courts have held
directly, implied, or stated in dicta that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII); Sardinia v. Deliwood Foods, Inc., No. Civ. 94-5458, 1995 WL
640502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1995) ("dominant trend" is to allow same-sex
claims); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 166-67 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("the
trend is to permit such claims to proceed"); see Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae of
the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU at 4, Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and
Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 872 (D. Md. 1994) ("The overwhelming majority of federal
courts that have addressed this issue have recognized that the sexual harassment
of a male by another male, or of a female by another female is actionable under
the statute."), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
11 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Ironically, seven years later another Illi-
nois district court decided Goluszek, on which the Fifth Circuit relied in Garcia to
hold that same-sex claims are not actionable. The Seventh Circuit has yet to de-
cide this issue.
112 Id. at 309.
11 Id. While this case specifically dealt with alleged quid pro quo harassment,
the courfs rationale for its holding was broad enough to apply to hostile environ-
ment harassment cases as well.
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sor." This was an issue of first impression in the Seventh
Circuit.115 Even though there was no direct precedent, the
court held that the supervisor's conduct clearly violated Title
MI.
1 1 6
The court reached this conclusion by examining other
court decisions which involved male-on-female sexual harass-
ment and by drawing analogies between opposite-sex sexual
harassment and same-sex sexual harassment.11 7 The court
reasoned that opposite-sex sexual harassment is a violation of
Title VII because a supervisor's demand upon a female employ-
ee that would not be made upon a male employee constitutes
sex discrimination." 8 The court stated that Wrights com-
plaint presented the reverse of that situation."9 Wrights
complaint alleged that the supervisor demanded sexual favors
from a male employee and did not demand similar favors from
a female employee. The employer treated Wright differently
from similarly situated female employees because of his gen-
der. In both cases-male-on-female harassment and male-on-
male harassment-the sexual advances directed toward em-
ployees based upon their sex violate Title VIis prohibition
against sex discrimination. The court concluded that but for
114 Id.
115 Id. The Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on whether same-sex harassment
claims are actionable.
" Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 309. Although the court was "unable to locate any
precedent for such a claim, [the court held that] Title VII should clearly encom-
pass [same-sex sexual harassment]." Id
11 Id.
11 Id.
'Whereas opposite-sex sexual harassment typically involves a male supervisor
making sexual advances towards a female employee because of her gender, the
Wright court held that Wrights complaint represented 'the obverse of that
coin... the alleged demand of a male employee that would not be directed to a
female." Id. at 310.
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Wright's status as a male, he would not have been ha-
rassed.12' Therefore, the supervisor discriminated against
him on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
In support of its holding, the court cited two decisions from
the District of Columbia Circuit.'2' While these cases in-
volved male-on-female harassment, the Wright court deter-
mined that the D.C. Circuit's arguments applied to same-sex
harassment. In Bundy v. Jackson,122 the court stated that
whenever sex is a substantial factor in the discrimination,
Title VII is violated."= The Bundy court did not distinguish
between same-sex and opposite-sex harassment, stressing in-
stead that anytime employment decisions are irrationally and
arbitrarily based upon sex, sex discrimination has oc-
curred. 24 The Wright court also followed the rationale of
Barnes v. Costle," which held that the legal issue is the
same for male-on-male sexual discrimination as for male-on-
female sexual discrimination: the imposition of a condition for
employment to which, but for the employee's sex, the employee
would not have been subjected.'26
120 The "but for" analysis was originally developed in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977), with respect to heterosexual harassment. In Barnes, the
court stated that "[blut for her womanhood .... her participation in sexual activi-
ty would never have been solicited." Id. The Barnes court held that the supervisor
placed an employment condition on a female that would not have been placed on
a male. The essential inquiry is "but for plaintiffs gender, plaintiff would not have
been harassed." Id. The Wright court relied on the but for standard originated in
Barnes. The Wright court was the first to interpret Title VII to encompass a com-
plaint of homosexual harassment. Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassment
and Title VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (1989).
121 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
123 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123 The Bundy court stated that "discrimination is sex discrimination whenever
sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination." Id. at
942. The Bundy court was the first court to recognize a claim of hostile work
environment sex discrimination.
124 Id.
12' 561.F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
12 Id. at 990 ("[T]he legal problem would be identical to that confronting us
now [if a] subordinate of either gender [was sexually harassed] by a homosexual
superior of the same gender.").
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Shortly after Wright, in Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transporta-
tion,'" an Alabama district court also held that same-sex sex-
ual harassment involving unsolicited homosexual advances is
actionable under Title VII.' Both the Joyner and Wright
courts incorrectly added a "homosexual intent" element to their
discussion of whether the sexual harassment was gender
based. In contrast, in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases,
courts do not look to a "heterosexual intent" element. While
the Supreme Court in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases
focuses only on whether the harassment was motivated by the
victim's gender, and not on the sexual orientation of the ha-
rasser, the Joyner and Wright courts deviated from the tradi-
tional Title VII inquiry and focused instead on the defendant's
sexual orientation and homosexual proclivities. Following the
lead of these early cases, recent decisions have also incorrectly
focused on the sexual orientation of the employer in determin-
ing whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable.'
Joyner was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit without opinion,
and as a result, little guidance was available to other circuits
on how to analyze same-sex claims.
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors."0 The McWilliams court held that no hostile
597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affld without opinion. 749 F.2d 732 (11th
Cir. 1984).
The unwelcome sexual harassment alleged in Joyner consisted of the manag-
er inviting plaintiff to enter the manager's car, placing his hands on plaintiffs
genitalia and asking plaintiff to engage in sexual activities. Plaintiff refused and
was thereafter laid off from work. The court found that the defendant maintained
a legitimate reason for initially laying off plaintiff--the downsizing of its work
staff. Nevertheless, the court held that defendant's actions constituted quid pro
quo harassment. Id. at 539.
" See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996),
discussed infra pp. 1190-1191. After Joyner, several years passed before the issue
of same-sex harassment was revisited. The reason for this hiatus is unclear. How-
ever, the increase in sexual harassment suits as a result of Professor Anita Hill's
testimony during Justice Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings has been at
least one factor in the recent onslaught of same-sex harassment cases. After Jus-
tice Thomas's confirmation hearings, the nation's consciousness about sexual ha-
rassment was heightened and within one year the number of cases involving
same-sex harassment grew dramatically. David Tuller, Trends in the Workplace
Rise in Gay Sex-Harassment Cases, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1995, at Al. Presum-
ably, an even larger number never reached the courts, either because of settlement
or because plaintiffs failed to pursue legal remedies.
= 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL. 72 (1996). The Fourth Cir-
1996] 1189
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
work environment Title VII cause of action lies where both the
perpetrator and the victim are heterosexuals of the same
sex."3' The court based its conclusion on the fact that the
plaintiff did not allege or prove that any of his supervisors
were homosexual. 112 The dissent stated that the nature of the
coworkers' conduct-including sexually offensive touching and
forcing themselves upon plaintiff'33-- suggests that such ha-
rassment was directed at McWilliams because he was a man,
and that the plaintiff should not be required to allege and
prove the sexual orientation of the perpetrators.'" According
to the dissent, such a requirement "would shift the [Title VII]
focus.., to a pursuit (surely to be complicated, far ranging,
and elusive) of the 'true' sexual orientation of the harass-
er."3 The McWilliams court specifically reserved the issue of
whether Title VII proscribes erotic same-sex sexual harass-
ment where the supervisor is homosexual.'36
The Fourth Circuit answered this question in Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of America,'37 where the court held that a hostile
work environment claim may lie where the supervisor is homo-
sexual and the harassment is erotically driven.'38 Wrightson,
a male employee, alleged that his homosexual male supervisor
and coworkers made sexual advances toward him because of
his sex.3 9 The court reasoned that the statutory language of
Title VII places no gender limitations on the perpetrators or
cuit in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. declined to address the issue of
whether Title VII proscribes same-sex sexual harassment; instead the Court af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of a same-sex claim on other grounds. 77 F.3d
745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
131 McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
' Id.
' McWilliams involved a male employee whose coworkers, on several occasions,
tied McWilliams's hands together, blindfolded him and forced him to his knees.
During these instances a coworker placed his finger in McWilliams's mouth to
simulate oral sex, and another coworker placed a broomstick to McWilliams's anus
while a third coworker exposed his genitals. Other harassment included, but was
not limited to, fondling and verbal sexual harassment of McWilliams. Id. at 1193.
34 Id. at 1199.
... Id. at 1198.
138 McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
13, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
138 Id. at 143.
'' Specifically, Wrightson alleged that his coworkers would pressure him to
engage in sexual acts, would constantly make sexually lewd remarks and innuen-
does, and would touch Wrightson in sexually provocative ways. Id. at 138-39.
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targets of harassment, nor does it require that they be of the
opposite sex. The court concluded that an employee is harassed
because of his or her sex if "but for" the employee's sex, he or
she would not have been discriminated against.' The court
reasoned that because the supervisor was a homosexual, he
subjected McWilliams, a male, to disparate treatment because
of his sex. The Wrightson court stated that the sexual orienta-
tion of the harasser is a determinative factor.'4 In doing so,
the court dangerously turned away from the traditional Title
VII inquiry, which focuses on whether the harassment was
gender-motivated. The court transformed the inquiry into an
investigation of the sexual orientation of the harasser, instead
of asking whether the conduct was gender-based. Thus, the
holding suggests that the Fourth Circuit will only recognize
erotic, and not non-erotic, same-sex sexual harassment claims.
In all of the cases where erotic same-sex sexual harass-
ment has been actionable under Title VII, courts have relied
on the "but for" standard, which reasons that but for the
employee's sex, the employee would not have been treated in
that manner.' This standard and the rationales utilized in
the above cases are indicative of the reasoning employed by
the majority of courts addressing same-sex sexual harassment
claims."
1 0 I& at 142.
" Id. at 143.
1 The following cases are examples of court decisions that have held that
same-sex harassment is actionable and that have relied upon the 'but-for your
sex" standard: McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229,
232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff, a female employee, proved that
'but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment,7
and therefore the employer violated Title VI); Roe v. K-M-art Corp., No. CIV.A.
2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing both Joyner and Wright in
holding that unwanted same-sex sexual advances are "based on the employer's
sexual preference and necessarily involve[ ] the plaintiffs gender for an employee
of the non-preferred gender would not have inspired the same treatment");
Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., 67 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1377 (E.D. La. 1995) (stating that plaintiff must demonstrate that "but for" her
sex, she would not have been the object of harassment); see EEOC v. Walden
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). This list provides a sample of
cases recognizing same-sex sexual harassment and is by no means complete.
1 See infra pp. 1197-99 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the prob-
lems that result from applying the "but for' standard.
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C. Courts that Have Held that Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
of a Non-Erotic' Nature Is Actionable under Title VII
The Eighth Circuit, in Quick v. Donaldson Co., 45 is the
only circuit thus far to hold that same-sex sexual harassment
of a non-erotic nature may state a cause of action under Title
VII.' Quick, a male employee, brought a hostile work envi-
ronment suit alleging that his male coworkers subjected him to
"bagging," physical assault and verbal harassment, including
falsely labeling and taunting Quick about being homosexu-
al."47 In fact, the record states that both Quick and his co-
workers were heterosexual. "
The district court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants.' Relying on reasoning similar to that used in
Goluszek, the district court opined that because the workplace
did not constitute an anti-male atmosphere, and was not pre-
dominately female, Quick failed to state a cause of action un-
der Title VII. 5" The district court concluded that the chal-
lenged conduct was not sexual harassment because it did not
express sexual interest, constitute sexual advances, or involve
1" To reiterate, non-erotic harassment includes derogatory statements, ridicule,
verbal or physical assaults, and unwelcome criticism directed at the employee
because of the employee's gender. See, e.g., Burns v. Andrews, 989 F.2d 959, 964-
65 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff prevailed on sexual harassment suit where supervisor
referred to her via derogatory and degrading language, including "bitch," "slut,"
"cunt," and "asshole"); Andrews v. City of Pennsylvania, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that "pervasive use of derogatory language and insulting terms
relating to women generally .. . may serve as evidence in hostile environment
suits"); see also Thorpe, supra note 8, at 1363.
14 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
"' Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary
judgment for defendants on non-erotic same-sex sexual harassment claim).
17 Id. at 1372. "Bagging" typically refers to an action aimed at a man's groin
area; it includes grabbing and squeezing another man's testicles or making a feint-
ing or flicking motion to that effect. The physical assaults included an incident
where a coworker held plaintiffs arms while another grabbed and squeezed his
left testicle, producing swelling and bruising. Another assault consisted of punching
plaintiff in the neck. The verbal harassment included falsely labeling plaintiff as a
homosexual, calling him "queer," and placing tags on him which depicted sexual
acts with cucumbers and stated "pocket lizard licker" and "gay and proud." Id. at
1374-75.
148 Id. at 1374.
1 Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd, 90
F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
"0 Id. at 1295.
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requests for sexual favors.'5' Lastly, the district court stated
that the coworkers' conduct was mere horseplay and hooligan-
ism based on personal enmity and not on sex.52
The Eight Circuit reversed. The circuit court quickly dis-
posed of the district court's reasoning by declaring that protec-
tion under Title VII is not limited to only disadvantaged or
vulnerable groups; rather, it extends to all employees discrimi-
nated against because of their sex.'" Moreover, the circuit
court stated that the challenged conduct constituted sexual ha-
rassment even though it was not based on sexual desire.'
Additionally, the court refused to regard the conduct as mere
horseplay.
155
The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff satisfied the ele-
ments established in Meritor for stating a hostile work envi-
ronment claim. The court reasoned that Quick is a member of
a protected group (men), and that he was subjected to unwel-
come sexual harassment by his coworkers.' The court spe-
cifically noted that conduct constituting actionable sexual ha-
rassment need not be explicitly sexual in nature, nor must it
have sexual overtones." The court reiterated the Supreme
Court's language in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' where
the Court stated that "Title VII 'strikes at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women in employment' in
order to provide a workplace free of 'discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule and insult." 9 Accordingly, the coworkers'
physical and verbal harassment constituted actionable conduct
under Title VII, regardless of the fact that it was not erotically
motivated. Moreover, the conduct at issue was clearly unwel-
... Id at 1296.
1" Id. at 1297. Similar arguments were traditionally advanced by defendants
and accepted by courts in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases and in race dis-
crimination cases, but have since been rejected. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 83-
90.
15 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
15 I&; see supra note 8 for a discussion of non-erotically motivated conduct
constituting sexual harassment.
"7 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1376.
"7 Id. at 1377-78.
"7Id. at 1377 (citing Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d
1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1988)).
"7 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
"7 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370).
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come, uninvited and offensive.16 Quick satisfied the remain-
ing elements by establishing that the harassment was based
on his sex by showing that women were not subjected to such
treatment.161 Further, the court found that the harassment
was sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an abusive
work environment, and that the employer failed to remedy the
conduct.1
62
The Eighth Circuit's decision is most significant because it
recognizes that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable
when the defendants' conduct does not consist of sexual ad-
vances and there are no allegations that defendants are homo-
sexuals. The Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion by analyz-
ing the various forms of harassing conduct that violate Title
VII and by concluding that the coworkers' gender-motivated
conduct satisfied the standards articulated by the Supreme
Court for creating a hostile work environment. The Eighth
Circuit noted that because Congress intended to define dis-
crimination broadly, it did not enumerate specific discriminato-
ry conduct "nor elucidate the parameters of such nefarious
activities."" Accordingly, the court noted that sexual harass-
ment may occur in many forms that are unrelated to sexual
desire, including physical violence and verbal abuse.' Spe-
cifically, the court stated that "a worker need not be
propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual innu-
endo in order to have been sexually harassed."'65
The Quick decision is noteworthy for its rejection of the
Fifth Circuit rationale in the Garcia/Goluszek line of cases,
which focuses on whether thb plaintiff can demonstrate an
anti-male environment. Quick is also significant for its depar-
ture from the Fourth Circuit approach in McWilliams, which
held that sexual harassment between heterosexuals of the
same sex is not actionable.166
"6 Id. at 1378.
161 Id.
" Id. at 1377.
1 Id. (citing Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted)).
Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377.
6 Id. at 1379 (citing Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964
(8th Cir. 1993)).
16 McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
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Relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision and rationale, a
Colorado district court in Gerd v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.,"6 held that a male employee's claim of non-erotic same-
sex sexual harassment was cognizable under Title VII. This
issue was a matter of first impression in the Tenth Circuit.
Gerd's complaint alleged that he was subjected to "unwelcome
sexual or otherwise abusive conduct which was directed at
him... because of his gender." s The conduct consisted of
taunting Gerd about having numerous boyfriends and referring
to him as a member of the Village People," as well as physi-
cal harassment including coworkers approaching Gerd from be-
hind and thrusting their pelvises forward in a manner resem-
bling fornication. Defendant UPS cited to authority from
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits to support its position that same-
sex sexual harassment was not actionable under Title VIIYM
However, the Gerd court relied on the Eighth Circuit decision
in Quick. In fact, the Gerd court arguably went further in ad-
vancing the broad goals of Title VII and in focusing the Title
VII inquiry on whether the harassment was gender based, re-
gardless of the sexual orientation of the perpetrator or the
victim. The Gerd court explicitly stated that "Ij]ust as courts do
not inquire into the sexual preferences of the victim in cases of
opposite sex harassment, the sexual preference of the victim
should be a non-issue in a same-sex sexual harassment
case."
172
Gerd alleged that the sexually offensive conduct was di-
rected at him because he was a man. The court did not inquire
into Gerd's sexuality, nor did it mischaracterize the issue as
harassment of homosexuals. According to the court, "although
the motive and causation may be less evident in same-sex
167 934 F. Supp. 357 (1996).
* Id. at 358.
16 The Village People was a 1970s pop music group that flaunted the homosex-
uality of its members.
17" Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 358. Additional harassment included coworkers grab-
bing and squeezing Gerd's buttocks in the presence of other employees, and contin-
uous jokes about Gerd engaging in sex with other men.
,7 Id. at 359. UPS relied on McWilliams and Garcia, respectively.
172 Id. at 360 (citing Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351,
355 (D. Nev. 1996) (citations omitted)).
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sexual harassment actions," the facts alleged were sufficient to
state a Title VII claim because the conduct was directed at
Gerd because of his sex.
173
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: BOTH EROTIC AND
NON-EROTIC SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT VIOLATE
TITLE VII
A. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment of an Erotic Nature
The most publicized form of sexual harassment occurs in
cases where a male supervisor makes unwelcome sexual ad-
vances toward his female employees. While the typical scenario
involves a man making sexually suggestive advances toward a
woman, sexual harassment also occurs when women sexually
harass men, when men harass men or when women harass
women.
7 4
A few hypotheticals will illustrate this point. Assume the
typical heterosexual sexual harassment situation of a male
employer making sexual advances toward his female employee.
Imagine, for example, a male employer who continuously in-
vites his female employee to dinner, makes sexually suggestive
comments to her, fondles her on several occasions, asks her to
engage in sexual relations with him and ultimately forces
himself upon her. In Meritor, based on similar facts, the Su-
preme Court held that such conduct constitutes sex discrimina-
tion. The Court stated that "[wlithout question, when a super-
visor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the basis of
sex."75 The employer's actions violate Title VII because the
employer is targeting and mistreating the woman because of
her biological sex. He is focusing on her sex and not her merit
and is therefore creating a barrier to sexual equality in the
workplace. It is undisputed today that hostile environment
harassment, as articulated in Meritor, violates Title VII. While
17 Id.
174 Sexually harassing behaviors constitute harassment of a sexual nature that
is motivated by erotic desire.
17 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
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the facts in Meritor involved the most common form of harass-
ment, male-on-female, the Court's reasoning and holding was
not limited to such interactions.7 6
Now assume that the employer and the employee are both
male,1" and that this employer is engaging in the exact same
behavior as the employer above: The employer constantly ha-
rasses his male employee for dates, makes sexually suggestive
comments to him, fondles him at work, and asks him to partic-
ipate in sexual relations. Here also, the male employer is mak-
ing a particular decision to mistreat his employee because of
the employee's biological sex. Whenever gender is used as a
criterion in harassment, the conduct is gender discrimination.
As in opposite-sex harassment, this supervisor is sexually
harassing his subordinate because of the subordinates sex.
Thus, the male employer's actions violate Title VII.
The harassment in each scenario is directed at the employ-
ee because of the employee's sex. These situations should not
be treated differently under Title VII simply because the gen-
der of the harasser and the harassed are the same. Nor should
they be treated differently because of the sexual orientation of
the employer or the employee. There simply is no need for an
investigation into the perpetrator's sexual orientation because
the sexual orientation of the harasser is irrelevant to a Title
VII claim. 78 The determinative factor in both scenarios is
that gender is used as a criterion in an employment deci-
sion. 79 Once this is recognized, it follows logically that both
scenarios constitute sex discrimination and violate Title VII.
176 Thomas A. WViseman, Jr., Same-Sex Sexual Harassment is Actionable Under
Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 63 U.S.L.W. 2710 (US. May 23, 1995).
11 The male employee may be either homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual. The
male employer making the advances presumably will be either homosexual or
bisexual
17" Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996).
'1 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae of the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU at
2, Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 872 (D. hid. 1994), affd,
77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (U.S. Oct. 7 1996). "The
sole question for a court in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim of
sexual harassment is whether he or she was mistreated because of his or her sex
This inquiry is identical regardless of the genders of the harasser and the vic-
tims." Id. However, if an employer can demonstrate that the gender-based decision
was motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business necessity, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason was merely a
pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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The same rationale should be applied to situations where
women make sexual advances toward other women. Where a
female employer makes a gender-conscious decision to harass a
woman, the employer is using gender as a criterion. This con-
duct is sex discrimination because the female employer is mis-
treating the female employee because of her sex.
1. Traditional Approach: "But For Your Sex" Standard
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, and a host of district
courts that have held that erotic same-sex sexual harassment
is actionable under Title VII, have reached the proper conclu-
sion, but they have relied on a problematic standard. These
courts have relied on the "but for your sex" standard, which
provides that a Title VII cause of action lies where the supervi-
sor would not have subjected the employee to such conduct but
for his or her sex. This standard fails to account for an individ-
ual that harasses both genders equally. Most courts either
have shied away from addressing the logical problems raised
by the bisexual harasser or have indicated that a bisexual
harasser would be immune from liability.80 The former ap-
proach merely postpones the issue, while the latter approach is
both illogical from a legal point of view and absurd from a
policy perspective.
A bisexual harasser is one who makes unwelcome sexual
advances to both men and women alike. Courts that have re-
lied on the "but for your sex" standard have stated that the
bisexual harasser is not discriminating on the basis of gender
because his or her offensive conduct is applied equally to both
men and women. Thus, courts applying this standard have
indicated that bisexual harassers are not subject to liability
under Title VII. 1 To illustrate, imagine a male bisexual em-
" There are no reported cases of a bisexual supervisor erotically harassing
both sexes. However, courts have inferred in dicta that bisexual harassment would
not be covered under Title VII. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Jones v. Flagship
Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
... McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that all sexual harassment is based upon sex and is a violation of Title VII except
where the employer is bisexual and subjects men and women to the same harass-
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ployer who harasses both a female and a male employee. The
female employee cannot successfully argue that but for her sex
she would not have been discriminated against. Her argument
fails under the "but for" standard because if she were a man
she may still be subject to the bisexual employer's sexual ad-
vances. Because the bisexual harasser may demand sexual
favors of both male and female employees, neither gender is
the "but for" cause of the employer's harassment. Therefore,
several courts have suggested that bisexual harassers are
immune from liability.
Most courts, however, have avoided the logical inconsisten-
cies created by applying the "but for" standard to cases where
supervisors harass employees of each gender. For example, in
Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., the district court
sought to distinguish bisexual harassment from equal opportu-
nity harassment. The Chiapuzio court labeled this case an
equal opportunity harassment case rather than a bisexual
harassment case in order to show Title VII violations.Is In
Chiapuzio, the male supervisor's harassment of each gender
was different: His harassment of women was of an erotic na-
ture while his harassment of men was of a non-erotic nature.
The Chiapuzio court broke from the rationale of prior courts
which relied on the "but for your sex" standard.'" Instead,
the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor
which "moved away from a disparate treatment or 'but-for'
analysis of gender harassment."'"
ment)). The McCoy court further states that only in the "exceedingly atypical case
of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is dizerimina-
tion based upon sex." Id. (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 905); see Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we
imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination-where a bisexual
supervisor harasses men and women alike.").
18 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
18 Id. at 1337 (holding that sexually offensive comments directed at women and
men may amount to gender harassment in violation of Title VII). The Chiapuzio
case involved a supervisor that harassed married couples by making comments
that the supervisor could satisfy the women better than their husbands. The court
distinguished between bisexual harassment and equal opportunity harassment. Id.
1 Id. at 1336.
15 Id.
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The Chiapuzio court concluded that the equal harassment
of both genders does not escape the purview of Title VII.'88
The court stated that the employer harassed the man because
he was male and the woman because she was female.'87 That
is, the employer harassed both genders because of their gender.
Using this paradigm, the bisexual harasser would also be lia-
ble under Title VII.
2. New Approach: "Because Of Your Sex" Standard
The application of a new modified "because of your sex"
standard hinted at in Chiapuzio is necessary to ensure that
the goal of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination is
met. Instead of asking whether discrimination occurred but for
the plaintiffs sex, the determinative inquiry should be whether
the discrimination occurred because of plaintiffs sex. 8' While
the difference may appear slight, this new standard is more
closely in accordance with the statutory language and goals of
Title VII. In fact, the statutory language specifically states
that it is "an unlawful employment practice to discriminate
against an individual because . . . of sex."' Thus, the plain
meaning of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination based on
sex suggests that the "because of your sex" standard is the ap-
propriate standard. Despite this statutory language, several
courts have interpreted Title VII to apply only where the dis-
crimination would not have occurred but for the plaintiffs
sex. 9' This interpretation is inaccurate and misleading. The
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 9' stated that
"to construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for
' Id. at 1337; see Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that sexually offensive comments directed at both women and men
can constitute a Title VII violation where the harassment of women was different
from the harassment of men).
18 Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337. The court stated that "where a harasser
violates both men and women, 'it is not unthinkable to argue that each individual
who is harassed is being treated badly because of gender.'" Id. (quoting John J.
Donahue, Review Essay: Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Dis.
crimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610-11 (1992)).
" The inquiry should be whether gender was a factor in the employment deci-
sion. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
1 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
191 Id.
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'but for causation' is to misunderstand them."11 "But for"
causation represents the outermost limits of what may be
shown in order to prove sex discrimination. That is, "but for"
causation is sufficient, but not necessary.'
Moreover, the "because of your sex" standard is preferable
to the "but for" standard because the latter necessitates an im-
proper inquiry into the sexual orientation of the harasser,
whereas the former is able to address gender discrimination
without inquiring into the harasser's sexual orientation. Sexu-
al orientation should not be a factor when determining wheth-
er or not the victim of sexual harassment has a legal reme-
dy.' 4 Indeed, from the victim's point of view it makes no dif-
ference whether the harasser is male, female, heterosexual, ho-
mosexual or bisexual. Application of the "because of your sex"
standard would help accomplish the broad anti-discrimination
goals of Title VII.
B. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment of a Non-Erotic Nature
It is undisputed that an employer's harassment, if based
on the gender of an employee, violates Title VII. Thus, the
harassment need not be sexually motivated to be actionable
under Title VII. "Title VII does not require that sexual harass-
ment be motivated by attraction, only that it be 'because of
sex.'"19 Harassment that is based on an individual's biologi-
cal sex but is not motivated by erotic desires may include phys-
ical abuse, verbal taunting and rude or derogatory statements.
Often such harassment is directed at an employee because the
employee fails to conform to the socially-constructed gender
roles traditionally assigned to each sex.1" The socially-con-
192 Id,
19 The Supreme Court has stated that plaintiffs need not show "but for" causa-
tion. If, however, 'but for" causation is proven, the plaintiff will undoubtedly pre-
vail. Id
I Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996)
(holding that the sexual preference of the harasser should be irrelevant to Title
vii claims).
I" Id. Harassment, like other types of victimization, is often motivated by the
need to control others and exert one's power. While this conduct may be expressed
through sexual advances, it need not be. Id.
'L Individuals who do not conform to the traditional gender role3 associated
with their sex are often labeled "effeminate men! or "masculine women." Because
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structed conduct and characteristics stereotypically deemed
"appropriate" for men include, but are not limited to, rational,
aggressive, domineering, independent and sexually experienced
behavior.197  In contrast, socially-constructed conduct and
characteristics stereotypically deemed "appropriate" for women
include emotional, submissive, subordinate, dependent and
sexually naive behavior." 8
,Harassment of an employee because the employee's con-
duct does not conform to the stereotypical traditional sex roles
or sex ideals'99 is sex discrimination.0 0 An employer who
of the obvious offensiveness of such terms, this Note will refer to such individuals
as nonconformists. Hereinafter, the term "nonconformist" or "nonconforming" is
used to refer to individuals who do not conform to the socially-constructed gender
ideals that society has traditionally sought to impose as gender norms.
" See Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a
Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1973, 1976 (1995) [hereinafter
Patriarchy Is Such a Drag]. Issues surrounding socially constructed gendered char-
acteristics are frequently discussed by feminist theorists. See generally KATHERINE
T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW (1993); SmiONE DE BEAUVOiR, THE SECOND SEX
(H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1957); HOLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING: CONFRONT-
ING THE LZI rs OF DUALITY (1989); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED (1987); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic
Discourse, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 324 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
... Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1976. At the risk of belabor-
ing the obvious, these characteristics, of course, are generalized stereotypes. They
are by no means exclusive to or indicative of either gender, nor are they "deemed
appropriate" by all men and women.
1" Throughout this Note the terms sex roles and gender roles have been used
interchangeably. Sex roles and gender roles refer to the behavior, conduct and
traits that are stereotypically and traditionally associated with each sex. Arguably,
these behaviors have nothing to do with biological sex; rather these gender roles
are created, constructed, assigned, enforced and perpetuated by society. That is,
there is no inherent female gender role or male gender role; these roles are merely
ideals created by society in order to maintain the superior status of men. See
MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 152-58. Sex roles prescribe appropriate male and
female conduct and allocate power "in the interest men and to detriment of wom-
en." MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 157. "[Olne function of the female sex role is to
reinforce the impression, and create the social actuality, of male dominance and fe-
male subordination." MACKINNON,, supra note 8, at 157; see generally, DEVOR,
supra note 197 (gender roles are the product of systematic power imbalances
based on gender discrimination). If all women adhered to their assigned "gender
ideals"--passive, maternal, nurturing, domestic, dependent, relational, emotional
and sexually passive-men in society would be able to maintain their socially
created status and ground that status in biological sex. Similarly, if all men ad-
hered to their assigned "gender ideals"--aggressive, independent, powerful, career-
oriented, sexually active, individualistic, public and rational-men would be able to
tout that, because of their biological sex and the traits inherent in it, they are
superior beings. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1973, 1976, 2008.
"0 See Goluszek discussion supra pp. 1181-1184 and accompanying notes. The
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makes distinctions based on "appropriate" behaviors for men
and "appropriate" behaviors for women either consciously or
unconsciously devalues women. Inherent in the distinction be-
tween "acceptable" male and female conduct is a value judg-
ment that male behaviors are superior to female behaviors."'1
The socially-constructed "male behaviors" have historically and
traditionally been more highly esteemed than socially-con-
structed "female behaviors."" 2 Consequently, the enforcement
and maintenance of these gender ideals perpetuates a system
of male hierarchy and female subordination. Individuals who
transcend these gender categories by not conforming to gender
role stereotypes threaten the status quo. The Supreme Court
in Price Waterhouse recognized that employer decisions that
are based on such rigid distinctions between appropriate con-
duct for men and women violate Title VII.
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Gender Stereotyping Is
Sex Discrimination
'[Ain employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman can-
not be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender." - U.S. Supreme Court (1989)'
The Supreme Court condemned gender stereotyping in the
employment context in the early 1970s,zu and the EEOC
harassment in Goluszek was based on plaintiffs failure to conform to the stereo-
typical image of "appropriate" male behaviors. The coworkers subjected Goluszek to
such treatment because he was a male. While the harassment was directed toward
Goluszek, a male, and not toward a female, it was also denigrating to women
because of the offensive and derogatory language about women as sex objects.
o ' See generally Case, supra note 4, at 72; Catherine A. Macinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: JOURNAL
OF WOMEEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 635 (1983) (=Each sex has its role, but their
stakes and power are not equal."); see also DEVOR, supra note 197.
" "[Glendered characteristics... seen as masculine are often more highly
valued than those seen as feminine." Case, supra note 4, at 6, 17. See supra note
197 for a list of representative feminist theorists whose works are commonly asso-
ciated with such views.
s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
2o4 In Frontiero v. Richardson, statutes that facially discriminated against wom-
en were held unconstitutional. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (adopting a sex stereotyping
approach to constitutional law- and opposing "invidiously relegating the entire class
of females to inferior legal status"). In 1979, the Supreme Court later revisited the
issue of impermissible sex stereotyping. The Court held that decisions made on the
basis of gender 'carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper
place of women." Case, supra note 4, at 38 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283
19961 1203
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Guidelines and various district court cases had proscribed gen-
der stereotyping since the 1960s. 2 5 However, it was not until
1989 that the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse recognized
that gender stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination."'
The Court held that the defendants violated Title VII by fail-
ing to promote a qualified woman because she did not conform
to the stereotypical traits associated with her sex.0 7
In Price Waterhouse, the employer described the female
employee, Ann Hopkins, as "aggressive" and "macho."2 8 She
was advised by her superiors to "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry."20 9 The Court .stated that
an employer "who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender."210 The employer's conduct violated Title VII
on two levels. First, the employer would not have harassed a
male for exhibiting the same behaviors. Therefore, the employ-
er discriminated because of the female employee's sex. Second,
this harassment is discrimination because the employer was
sex stereotyping-relying upon traditional and harmful notions
of acceptable conduct for women. The Court stated that
we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group, for "in forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes."'
(1979)).
205 Case, supra note 4, at 37. Sex stereotyping has been defined as "the assign-
ing of certain behavioral characteristics as appropriate for women or for men, but
not for the other sex." Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dig. (CCH) J1 41,332 (6th
Cir. 1992).
206 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
207 Several feminist theorists would argue that stereotypical gender role traits
are assigned to each sex, rather than "associated" with each sex. For an in-depth
discussion of this assertion, see Butler, supra note 197; Patriarchy Is Such a Drag,
supra note 197.
20 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. Other supervisors stated that Hopkins
"overcompensated for being a woman" and that she "had matured from a tough-
talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed manager to an authoritative, formidable,
but much more appealing lady." Hopkins was also criticized for cursing because
she was a "lady using foul language." Id.
209 Id.
211 Id. at 250.
211 Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
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The Price Waterhouse decision established that employers can-
not compel employees to exhibit socially-constructed gender
ideals or punish employees for failing to conform to such ideals
without violating Title VII.2 After Price Waterhouse, such
conduct violates Title VII.
The Supreme Court condemns sex stereotyping because it
reduces and confines women and men to separate spheres. The
"appropriate" female sphere is typically undervalued in society,
and thus sex stereotyping results in women being perceived as
inferior.21 The dangers inherent in sex stereotyping are inde-
pendent of the sex of the employer and of whether the employ-
er and employee are the same sex. Therefore, while Price Wa-
terhouse involved a male employer that discriminated against a
female employee, the same result should apply in cases where
a female employer subjects a female employee to similar con-
duct and ridicule that Hopkins experienced.
Assume a further variation of the facts in Price Water-
house-that a male employer is harassing his male employee
for "acting like a woman" because the male employee is exhib-
iting what are preceived to be stereotypical female traits: pas-
sivity, sensitivity, excitability or sexual naiveth.214 As in the
Price Waterhouse case, the employer's harassment is sex dis-
crimination for two reasons. First, the employer is harassing
the male employee because of his biological sex; had the em-
ployee been a woman exhibiting the same characteristics, the
employer would not have harassed the employee. Second, the
employer is indirectly enforcing traditional gender role behav-
iors. By harassing the male employee, the employer is seeking
to suppress the employee's "feminine" conduct that does not
conform to the employer's notions of "appropriate" male behav-
iors.215
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
212 Id.
21 See supra notes 197, 199, 201-202 and accompanying text.
214 These traits are examples of stereotypical characteristicm associated with
socially-constructed gender roles. Again, they are by no means exclusive to or
indicative of the female gender, they are merely utilized here to develop the argu-
ment. Accordingly, postmodern feminist theory refuses to treat gender as if it were
the truth about men and women. Rather, it focuses on the external forces--society,
law, environment-that uconstruct7 gender and gendered roles. See Patriarchy Is
Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1973; see supra notes 197-199.
21 The Goluszek case is a perfect example. In Goluszeh., male coworkers ha-
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As in Price Waterhouse, this employee, by exhibiting
transgender traits, presents a threat to the male hierarchy.21
The employee, whose biological sex is male but who exhibits
both socially-constructed "male" and "female" characteristics,
breaks down the strict barriers between what are considered
"male behaviors" and 'Temale behaviors," what makes "men"
distinct from "women."217 By transgressing these socially-con-
structed barriers, the employee presents a threat to the tradi-
tional patriarchal order, which depends for its existence on its
ability to "otherify" the female gender and women as a whole
in society.218 Therefore, the transgression of the socially con-
structed gender-ideal barriers jeopardizes the foundation of the
current system that subordinates women and privileges men.
rassed Goluszek, a male employee, because he did not demonstrate the
stereotypical traits associated with his gender- he was prudish, shy and sexually
inexperienced. Because he did not exhibit sexual prowess and a demeaning atti-
tude toward women that was shared by his coworkers, he was subject to harass-
ment. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
2' Similarly, gays and lesbians "threaten the stability of masculinity and femi-
ninity by making the repression of difference impossible." Patriarchy Is Such a
Drag, supra note 197, at 1975; see generally Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187.
217 Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1976.
218 "Masculinity and femininity are not only polar opposites, but also comple-
mentary-each is defined in terms of what the other is not." Patriarchy Is Such a
Drag, supra note 197, at 1976. Indeed, each depends upon the other for its status.
Cf Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1974; see DE BEAUVOIR, supra
note 197, at xv-xviii; Andrew Koppeman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law
as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 158 (1988) [hereinafter Miscegenation
Analogy] (homosexuality is threatening because it calls into question the distinct
and superior status of being male); Thomas Szasz, Legal and Moral Aspects of
Homosexuality, in SEXUAL INVERSION 124, 135 (J. Marmor ed., 1965) (homosexuals
do not threaten society by their actual conduct but rather by their symbolic signif-
icance).
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2. Expanding Price Waterhouse: Sexual Harassment of a
Gay or Lesbian Employee for Not Conforming to
His or Her Sexually-Defined Gender-Role Stereotype Is
Sex Discrimination2
The Price Waterhouse rationale should also apply to the
harassment of gay employees."0 Assume that Ms. Hopkins,
in addition to or in lieu of her aggressiveness and other "male"
behavioral traits, chooses to engage in sexual activity with
women. In addition, assume that Ms. Hopkins's employer
would not harass male employees for desiring or engaging in
sex with women. The harassment of Ms. Hopkins for her desire
to engage in sex with women would violate Title VII for the
same two reasons articulated in Price Waterhouse: first, the
employer would not have harassed a male employee who exhib-
its the same desires or who engages in the same activity; and
second, the harassment is a result of sex-role stereotyping. The
employer is, in effect, mandating that the woman's conduct
conform to heterosexual ideals and punishing her for not
conforming."2 The heterosexual paradigm that the employer
seeks to enforce is one that is premised on traditional sex roles
in which men are viewed as dominant and women as subor-
dinate, sexually and socially. Since the employer's conduct is
based on the employee's sex and on the employer's notion of
"accepted" sex-role behaviors, the harassment violates Title
VII.
21' The term "sexually-defined gender-role stereotype" refers to the heterosexal
ideal that "appropriate" male sexual activity occurs with a woman and
"appropriate" female sexual activity occurs with a man. Harassment of employees
who do not conform to the heterosexist sex-role stereotype is exactly the type of
sex stereotyping that the Supreme Court sought to eradicate in Price Waterhous.
22 The terms "gay" and "lesbian" in this section were added reluctantly. Once
the employee is labeled gay, it is likely that his or her case will be
mischaracterized as a claim of sexual orientation discrimination, rather than sex
discrimination. Courts have frequently mischaracterized valid same-sex harassment
claims based on sex discrimination as sexual orientation discrimination claims; this
misconception is dispositive. Once a court presumes sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, which is not protected under Title VII, the issue is unfairly predetermined.
As a result, discrimination "against effeminate men may be overdetermined, and
effeminacy conflated with gayness." Case, supra note 4, at 17. "Courts often
conflate gender with sex and particularly with sexual orientation." Case, supra
note 4. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, this Note will use the term "gay"
as an umbrella term encompassing both lesbian women and gay men.
= Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 197, at 1973.
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Similarly, a male employer who harasses a gay male em-
ployee for having sex with men is violating Title VII if the
employer would not have harassed a woman for having sex
with men.222 Therefore, the employer is treating men and
women differently because of their sex. To illustrate, if Mr.
Smith, a heterosexual male employer, verbally and physically
harasses Dave, a gay male employee who desires to have sex
with men, and does not similarly harass Jen, a female employ-
ee who also desires to have sex with men, then Mr. Smith's
conduct violates Title VII because he is harassing Dave on the
basis of his gender. If Dave were a female, like Jen, and exhib-
ited the same desire to have sex with men, Mr. Smith would
not have similarly harassed him.
As in Price Waterhouse, Mr. Smith mistreats Dave because
of Mr. Smith's own preconceived notions of "acceptable" gen-
der-role behaviors. At the heart of such harassment is the
heterosexist ideal that men are supposed to have sex with
women."' The employer, in essence, is making a decision
based upon his view of appropriate conduct for men (having
sex with women) as distinct from appropriate conduct for wom-
en (having sex with men). If the harassment is in response to
an individual's deviation from stereotypical gender roles, the
harasser is in effect attempting to reinforce such traditional
sex stereotypes.2" By trying to enforce different behaviors for
'2 Andrew Koppelnan, Why Discrimination Against Lesbian and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994) (if the same conduct is
prohibited when engaged in by an individual of one sex, but is tolerated when
engaged in by the other sex, then the party imposing the prohibition is discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex).
' Traditionally, women were expected to be passive participants in sex and to
be dominated by men. This led to the notion of women as the penetrated and
degraded sex. Koppelman, supra note 222, at 234. Arguably, one of the reasons
that gays are discriminated against is because they allow themselves to be pene-
trated like women. Gay men threaten "the hierarchical significance of sexual inter-
course and the polluted status of the penetrated person. The central outrage of
male sodomy is that a man is reduced to the status of a woman, which is under-
stood to be degrading." Koppelnan, supra note 222, at 235. Similarly, lesbianism
is threatening to the "hierarchical significance of sexual intercourse .... Lesbian-
ism is a form of insubordination: it denies that female sexuality exists or should
exist, only for the sake of male gratification." Koppeiman, supra note 222, at 236.
" Koppeiman, supra note 222, at 234; Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note
197, at 36 (discussing the perceived need for males to police gender boundaries
against any intrusion of the female in order to guard against taint by the inferi-
or); see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that sex stereo-
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men and women based on their sex, the employer creates and
mandates arbitrary differences between the sexes based on the
employer's belief in "gender-appropriate conduct." As the Su-
preme Court held in Price Waterhouse, this imposition of tradi-
tional sex roles is sex discrimination.'
3. Recognizing that Harassment of Gays and Lesbians
and Nonconforming Men and Women Perpetuates
Female Subordination
To understand how harassment of a nonconforming em-
ployee both directly harms the individual employee and indi-
rectly harms women in society overall, it is useful to look at a
similar situation that arose in the context of racial subordina-
tion.. In Loving v. Virginia,'6 the Supreme Court held that
miscegenation statutes, prohibiting whites and blacks from
marrying, were unconstitutional. The Court's decision in Lov-
ing recognized that the miscegenation laws, mandating tradi-
tional marriage relationships of white men and women, perpet-
uated the subordination of blacks by enforcing a separation be-
tween the races. 7 Similarly, non-erotic same-sex sexual ha-
rassment, which often mandates traditional sex roles, main-
tains a hierarchical system that elevates men and relegates
women to an inferior status.
In Loving, the Supreme Court declared that miscegenation
statutes prohibiting interracial marriages were unconstitution-
al because they drew distinctions on the basis of race. Propo-
nents of such statutes argued that they did not discriminate
because they treated blacks and whites equally-neither could
marry outside of their race.' Even though the statutory lan-
guage treated blacks and whites alike, the intent and effect of
the statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' These statutes were unconstitutional
for two reasons: First, such statutes directly discriminated on
basis of race by permitting persons to marry individuals of
typing is sex discrimination).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Koppelnan, Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 218, at 147.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
2 Id. at 12.
120919961
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
their own race but prohibiting such persons from marrying
individuals of another race. Second, the underlying purpose
and effect of these statutes was to support indirectly a hierar-
chical system that secured a superior status for whites and an
inferior status for blacks.Y50
The Supreme Court recognized that miscegenation laws
discriminated on the basis of race in order to maintain a sys-
tem of white supremacy."3 A superior white status could only
exist by differentiating and distinguishing itself from the black
population. White supremacy thrived on the notion that skin
color inherently dictated a certain social status assigned at
birth. White skin pigment was assigned a superior status and
nonwhite pigment was assigned an inferior status. Those in
favor of miscegenation statutes believed that the mixing of the
races would pollute the white's "superior status" by blurring
the distinctions between the two races. 2 Therefore, while
miscegenation statutes applied to both blacks and whites, the
underlying intent was to maintain white superiority.
Similarly, while interracial marriages threatened white
supremacy because they blurred the distinction between white
and black status, homosexuality and other nonconforming
conduct threatens male supremacy because it "calls into ques-
tion the superior status of being male" by blurring the distinc-
tions between "men" and "women."" The arguments sur-
rounding the dual discriminatory effect of miscegenation stat-
utes are applicable in the context of same-sex sexual harass-
ment not based on erotic desires. First, the harassment direct-
ly discriminates against the nonconforming employee who
exhibits characteristics or desires that would be acceptable if
exhibited by the opposite sex; and second, the harassment of
employees who fail to conform to stereotypical sex role behav-
2' Koppelman states that the purpose of miscegenation statutes was twofold.
"Beyond the immediate harm they inflict upon their victims, their purpose is to
support a regime of caste that locks some people into inferior social positions at
birth." Koppeiman, Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 218, at 147.
231 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; Koppelman, supra note 222, at 201.
"2 In upholding the constitutionality of these statutes, Virginia's highest court
reasoned that the statutes serve the state's legitimate interest to "preserve the
racial integrity of its citizens," to prevent "the corruption of blood" and "the oblit-
eration of racial pride." Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. The Loving Court referred to
Virginia's stated objectives as "obviously an endorsement of White Supremacy." Id.
Koppelman, Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 218, at 158-60.
[Vol. 62: 1165
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iors indirectly supports a heterosexual system that historically
secured a superior status for men and an inferior status for
women. Just as white supremacy was perpetuated by society's
ability to maintain separate spheres for whites and blacks, the
patriarchal system thrives on its ability to maintain socially
constructed differences between men and women. Employees
that blur these distinctions by not conforming to traditionally
accepted gender roles are in effect reinforcing and perpetuating
a heterosexual system that privileges men and disadvantages
women.
=
C. Courts that Have Held that Erotic and Non-Erotic Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment Are Actionable Have Reached the
Proper Conclusion by Incomplete Analysis
The district and circuit courts that have held that same-
sex sexual harassment claims are actionable have all reached
their conclusions based on the fact that the employee in each
case was subjected to differential treatment based upon his or
her sex."ce While this argument is logically sound and con-
forms to the broad goals of Title VII, this analysis is not fully
developed. Courts should go one step further and recognize and
address the more fundamental underlying issue: that gender-
based employment decisions, including the enforcement of tra-
ditional gender stereotypes, result in gender inequality in the
workplace. Courts need to analyze and discuss the effect of
disparate treatment on the sexes, and the resonating conse-
quences for women in society overall. Specifically, in non-erotic
harassment cases, where employers harass employees for not
conforming to the stereotypical roles associated with each sex,
courts have failed to recognize that such treatment ultimately
harms women by perpetuating traditionally accepted roles of
women-socially, sexually and politically. Additionally, courts
need to keep their inquiries focused on whether the harass
2" Discrimination against lesbians and gay men reinforce3 the hierarchy of
males over females and perpetuates the oppression of women. Koppelman, supra
note 222, at 197; see Law, supra note 216, at 187.
See supra Sections ILB, II.C.
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ment was motivated by the victim's gender, rather than in-
vestigating into the sexual orientation of the harasser or the
harassed.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR ALLOWING VICTIMS OF EROTIC AND
NON-EROTIC SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT TO RECOVER
UNDER TITLE VII
In recent years, the number of same-sex sexual harass-
ment cases has risen dramatically due to a growing acceptance
and recognition of sexual harassment claims in general.23
Also, this past decade has witnessed a greater openness re-
garding gay men and lesbian women in the workplace. The
combination of these trends will undoubtedly lead to an in-
creased number of erotic and non-erotic same-sex sexual ha-
rassment suits. Therefore, the need for clear guidelines and
their uniform application is imperative.
As more courts begin to recognize same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims, an increasing number of employees who are sexu-
ally harassed because of their gender will have a federal legal
remedy. Recognition of erotic and non-erotic same-sex sexual
harassment would allow heterosexual and homosexual victims
of gender harassment to seek legal redress for their victimiza-
tion. 7 While Title VII clearly does not prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, homosexuals harassed be-
" Approximately five percent of harassment cases fall into the same-sex catego-
ry. This proportion may increase as gays and lesbians become increasingly aware
of and vocal about their rights as employees. "There is a new political awareness
in the gay community that makes gays less willing to allow themselves to be
victimized.... And, as gays come to see the law as protecting their rights in
general, they will use the legal system more and more to stop discriminatory con-
duct." Susan Christian, Battle Against Same Sex Harassment Comes Out of the
Closet, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Edition), July 12, 1994.
' In holding that same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under
Title VII, courts will allow gay employees to achieve the same federal legal reme-
dies for sexual harassment as those possessed by heterosexuals since the early
1970s. The ability of gays to prevail on sexual harassment claims is a significant
step toward increasing gay and lesbian legal rights; however, it is hardly a substi-
tute for protection against sexual orientation discrimination. The issue regarding
whether sexual orientation harassment and discrimination should be actionable
under Title VII is beyond the scope of this Note.
[Vol. 62: 1165
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cause of their gender should be afforded the same existing
protections under Title VII as anyone else.' Title VII's ex-
clusion of sexual orientation as a protected category
cannot be extended to embrace the proposition that a homosexual
harasser may harass a person of the same sex with impunity, or
that a homosexual victim may be harassed by a person of the same
sex with impunity. Title VII protects all persons, vhether male or
female, heterosexual or homosexual, from discrimination based on
sex.2 9
The recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims is a
highly controversial issue and is often criticized by both hetero-
sexual and homosexual communities. Indeed, those arguments
that oppose same-sex sexual harassment claims reflect a very
narrow interpretation of Title VII, whereas current employ-
ment discrimination jurisprudence advocates a more expansive
reading of Title VII1 " That is, recent court decisions have
applied Title VII to nontraditional modes of discrimination
such as reverse race discrimination," reverse sex discrimi-
nation 2  and same-race racial harassment's Claims of
same-sex sexual harassment should also be included in this
broad and liberal reading of Title VII. As one commentator
notes, it would be "simply untenable to allow reverse [sex]
discrimination cases but not same-sex harassment cases under
' Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996).
219Id.
' The Supreme Court implied that Title Vii applies to nontraditional discrimi-
nation contexts by stating in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), that the standard for establishing discrimination should be modified to
accommodate different employment discrimination contexts. Vliseman, supra note
176.
241 The term "reverse race discrimination" refers to discrimination that occurs
when a member or members of a minority race discriminate against a member or
members of a majority race. Many courts have permitted reverse race discrimina-
tion actions under Title VIL See, eg., McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d
501 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that white doctor was the victim of reverse race dis-
crimination).
"4 The term "reverse sex discrimination" refers to discrimination which occurs
when a female employer discriminates against a male employee because of his
gender. See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
24 Courts have recognized that same-race racial discrimination violates Title
VII. Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (recognizing viability of intraracial discrimination claim); Walker
v. Secretary of Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (light-sdnned black as-
serting racial harassment by dark-skinned black supervisor).
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Title VII."' Men and women should have the right to pro-
tect themselves from harassment based on their sex, regardless
of the gender of their harasser.
Persuasive arguments have been made that court recogni-
tion of same-sex sexual harassment claims will only result in
harming gay employers. 5 This position is premised on the
fact that almost all of the district and circuit courts that have
held that same-sex sexual harassment violates Title VII have
done so only in cases concerning gay employers and heterosex-
ual employees.16 As a result, many people fear that the rec-
ognition of same-sex claims will amount to nothing more than
court-sanctioned homophobia. 7
Convincing arguments have also been made that the recog-
nition of same-sex claims would still fail to benefit nonconform-
ing employees who are discriminated against because of their
gender. The majority of courts often label such cases as "sexual
orientation" harassment cases and dismiss them summarily
without acknowledging the underlying and pervasive gender
discrimination which is at the root of such harassment.28
However, the Eighth Circuit in Quick 9 and the district court
in Gerd"° recently departed from these trends and recognized
Title virs applicability to same-sex claims, regardless of the
sexual orientation of the harasser or the harassed.
Just as courts do not inquire into the sexual preference of the victim
in cases of opposite-sex sexual harassment, the sexual preference of
the victim should be a non-issue in a same-sex sexual harassment
case. The focus should be on the harassing conduct itself and
whether the harassment is because of sex."l
244 Wiseman, supra note 176.
24. See generally Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment. Subverting the
Heterosexist Paradigm, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 375 (1995).
246 But see Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIVA.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783
(D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995) (holding gay employer liable for same-sex sexual
harassment of gay employee).
2W7 Wiseman, supra note 176.
24 See, e.g., Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D.
Nev. 1996).
249 Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
' Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996).
21 Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 355.
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The recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims
under Title VII will result in legal protections for all employees
who are subjected to discrimination because of their gender,
regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser or the
victim. The value of preventing gender-motivated employment
decisions outweighs the potential misuse that may accompany
any expansion of Title VII to include same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims.
CONCLUSION
Any form of harassment in the workplace that is based on
an individual's sex should be considered a violation of Title
VII. The central issue should be whether the harassment was
motivated by the employee's gender, not whether the employer
and employee are members of the same sex. Title VIis prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination has been interpreted to ensure that
gender is irrelevant to employment decisions. Title VII forbids
gender-motivated employment decisions because such decisions
systematically disadvantage women. By allowing same-sex sex-
ual harassment to exist and by withholding legal remedies to
victims of this discrimination, the courts permit gender to re-
main a factor in the workplace and therefore undermine the
effectiveness of Title VII. For these reasons, same-sex sexual
harassment, just like opposite-sex sexual harassment, consti-
tutes sex discrimination and violates Title VII.
Kara L. Gross'
* The author thanks Professor Anthony Sebok and Andrew Ep3tein for their
guidance and assistance throughout the writing process.
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